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Forcing Iterated Admissibility in Strategic
Belief Models
Summary. Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion
of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic
characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated in
recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving m + 1 rounds of iterated
admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called
rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete lexicographic type
structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, R∞AR,
might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is
complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we introduce a weaker notion
of completeness which is nonetheless sufficient to characterize IA in a highly general
way as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy R∞AR. The key methodological
innovation involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in
conjunction with Cohen’s technique of forcing.
1.1 Introduction
The epistemic analysis of game solutions has focused on the belief and knowl-
edge requirements for their existence. Well-known solution concepts are eval-
uated in terms of how demanding those requirements are. One of the less
demanding solutions is based on the idea that rational players will never
choose weakly dominated (inadmissible) actions [17]. Furthermore, the ideal
of a strategically stable equilibrium can be achieved through the iterated elim-
ination of inadmissible strategies [16]. Profiles that capture this intuition are
composed by actions that survive the iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies at successive levels. Strategies that meet this condition are known
as iterated admissible (IA) strategies.
The epistemic characterization of IA has been actively investigated in re-
cent times, because of the challenges that it poses. On one hand, the elimi-
nation of a weakly dominated strategy at a given round of deletion requires
the assumption that strategies deleted in previous rounds will not be used.
Yet on the other, the definition of admissibility indicates that at whatever
2relevant level of iteration some probability distribution exists in the context
of which a certain admissible strategy registers as a best response relative to
all other possibilities. The conceptual support for this notion thus entails the
potential inclusion of all the strategies of the other players. Therefore, none
can be discarded.
This inclusion-exclusion problem has been formally disposed by resorting
to Lexicographic Probability Systems [7]. A key result in this approach is that
strategies that survive m+1 rounds of iterated admissibility can be obtained
if players satisfy the epistemic condition known as rationality and m assump-
tion of rationality (RmAR) in complete type structures [7]. In other words,
intuitively, if there are “enough” types in a given model then a movement pre-
serving admissible solutions from level m to level m+ 1 is always possible in
that model under the RmAR condition. This would seem to suggest that the
limit case at infinity would also provide a solution (in a precise sense that we
clarify below), but it has been shown that this is not the case, that is, R∞AR
might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the types are
continuous and the class of types is complete. Nonetheless, if continuity is not
required [15] or completeness is not demanded [18] it can be proven that a
profile of strategies does indeed satisfy R∞AR if and only if it satisfies IA.
In this paper we investigate issues corresponding to the above in Qualita-
tive Type Spaces [17]. Within this latter framework, it has in fact been shown
that the construction of a complete type structure [6] is impossible. Our strat-
egy is – despite the impossibility of constructing a complete type structure –
to make use in this framework of the natural order relations emerging from
the hierarchy of iterated levels in order to generate a “new kind” of type,
called generic, which, when adjoined to the initial model, will be sufficient to
broaden it and thereby to guarantee that R∞AR is satisfied within it by a
straightforward application of Cohen’s technique of forcing. This, in conjunc-
tion with the result indicated above, will in turn entail that IA is also satisfied
in the enlarged (although not complete) model.
The mathematical tool of forcing was originally introduced by Paul Cohen
in order to show that Georg Cantor’s famous Continuum Hypothesis is inde-
pendent of the axioms of Zermelo-Frenkel Set Theory [10] [14]. Since then,
forcing has been mostly relegated to the realm of the foundations of Mathe-
matics; its use remains uncommon in applied fields. Philosophically, this may
be understood as a consequence of Shoenfield’s Theorem, which entails that
forcing yields results only in the non-absolute fragment of Mathematics, while
most of applied science would seem to be confined in the absolute realm [12].
In this work, however, we show that forcing can indeed be used in the present
case to provide definite features to the types associated to IA strategy profiles.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the notion of
IA solution while in section 3 we present a possibility-based epistemic model
of games and strategies. In section 4 a brief conceptual discussion of Cohen’s
method of forcing is given. In section 5 we then use forcing to address the
problem of defining generic types in strategic belief models. Finally, in section
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6 we show how these types ensure that R∞AR is equivalent (in terms of
strategies) to IA in this new context.
1.2 Iterated Admissibility
The strategic interaction among self-interested parties can be represented as
a strategic form game:
Definition 1.2.1 Let G = 〈I, {Si}i∈I , {pii}i∈I〉 be a game, where I =
{1, . . . , n} is a set of players and Si, i ∈ I is a finite set of strategies for each
player. A profile of strategies, s = (s1, . . . , sn) is an element of S =
∏
i∈I Si.
In turn, Πi : S → R is player i’s payoff.
The goal is to assess the solutions of the game, i.e. the family of profiles
S ⊆ S that might be expected to be chosen by the players. These profiles
capture the rationality of players, seeking to maximize their payoffs. Being
Πi(s) dependent on the choice of i, si as well as of the choices of the rest of
the players (denoted s−i ∈
∏
j 6=i Sj), a profile (si, s−i) ∈ S shows also the
coordination among agents that ensures this outcome.
One of the many possible solution notions stems from a basic postulate
of decision theory, namely that no player will choose a weakly dominated
(inadmissible) strategy. That is, if for si ∈ Si there exists σ∗i ∈ ∆Si (i.e. a
probability distribution over Si such that Πi(σ
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Πi(si, s−i) for every
s−i ∈ S−i and Πi(σ∗i , s¯−i) > Πi(si, s¯−i) for some s¯−i ∈ S−i, si will not be
chosen. Otherwise, si is called admissible with respect to Si × S−i. Then, if
we set S0i = Si for every i, we can define inductively:
Sm+1i = {si ∈ S
m
i : si is admissible with respect to
n∏
i=1
Smi }
where si ∈ Smi is said m-admissible, while si ∈ S
∞
i =
⋂∞
m=0 S
m
i is itera-
tively admissible. Thus, the set of iterated admissible (IA) strategies yields
the solution notion SIA =
∏n
i S
∞
i .
The interest in SIA resides in its naturality and in the achievement of
strategic stability it ensures [16]. In turn, it raises the question of the aspects
that contribute to the coordination on SIA, which is implicit since no com-
munication is allowed among the players. In particular, we might inquire into
those aspects of an epistemic nature, that is, those ensuing from the beliefs
and knowledge of the individual players.
1.3 Strategic Belief Model of a Game
We now show how these notions apply within Qualitative Type Spaces, which
allow us to characterize certain strategic aspects of games. In particular, we
4define the notion of Strategic Belief Model, which captures the epistemic as-
pects involved in any choice of strategies [6]:
M = ({Si}i∈I , {Ti}i∈I , {Pi}i∈I)
where for each i ∈ I, Si and Ti are i’s sets of strategies and types, respectively.
The structure intends to model a gameG and each strategy-type pair is a state
for a player, and each type of a player has beliefs about the states of the other
players. These beliefs are captured by the relations Pi that satisfy:
1. Pi : Ti → S−i × T−i is a correspondence.
2. For all ti ∈ Ti, Pi[ti] 6= ∅.
That is, Pi[ti] captures the strategies and types of the other players that
i thinks are possible.
The analysis of the rationality of players and the epistemic conditions of
solutions to the game can be fully disclosed up from the states of the game,
i.e. profiles of states of the players.
M has interesting features. The first one is that each ti can be “unfolded”
in terms of the types of the other players, which in turn leads to beliefs about
the type of i, etc.
To make this notion more precise, let us define for any ti of i, the unfolding
of ti:
• tj ∈ P 1i [ti] if there exists sj ∈ Sj with
1 〈(s−ij , t−ij), (sj , tj)〉 ∈ Pi[ti].
• tj ∈ Pmi [ti], for any natural number m, if there exists tk ∈ P
(m−1)
i [ti] such
that tj ∈ P 1k [tk].
This means that, if tj ∈ Pmi [ti], tj can be unfolded in m steps to ti, i.e. tj
is believed by ti by considering m steps of belief.
Another important feature of M is that it provides a powerful framework
for describing the epistemic aspects involved in a game [1]. The fundamental
concept here is that of assumption defined over events of M, i.e. on sets of
states of the game. For any E ⊆
∏
i(Si × Ti), the types of i that assume E
are denoted as ASi[E] with:2
ASi[E] = {ti ∈ Ti : Pi[ti] = E|
∏
j 6=i(Sj×Tj)
}
In particular, we say that at ti, i assumes that j 6= i is rational if ti ∈
ASi[j is rational], where the event “j is rational” is
{〈sj , tj ; s−j, t−j〉 : Πj(sj , s−j) ≥ Πj(s, s−j) for any s ∈ Sj with s−j ∈ Pj [tj ]|S−j}
Then, we can define the condition denoted RmAR (for Rationality and
m-Assumption of Rationality):3
1 Here s−ij (t−ij) denotes an element in
∏
k 6=i,k 6=j Sk (
∏
k 6=i,k 6=j Tk).
2 The notation E|
∏
j 6=i(Sj×Tj)
} indicates the projection of E, defined over
∏
i
(Si×
Ti) over
∏
j 6=i(Sj × Tj).
3 If Ei ⊆ Si × Ti, ASi[E
i] is a shorthand for ASi[
⋂
E:E|Si×Ti
=Ei E].
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• R0i = [i is rational]|Si×Ti .
• Rmi = R
m−1
i ∩ (Si ×ASi[
⋂
j 6=iR
m−1
j ]).
Then, finally, we can define condition R∞AR as that satisfied by all the
states in
∏n
i R
∞
i , where R
∞
i =
⋂
m≥0R
m
i for every i. That is, we have for-
mally characterized all the states in which players are rational, assume the
rationality of the others, assume that the others assume their own rationality,
etc.
1.4 R∞AR and IA
It is quite natural to think that R∞AR is an epistemic condition that supports
SIA. Indeed, this relation can be strengthened to make them equivalent, but
this identification hinges on the properties of the space of types. More par-
ticularly it relies on its richness, since there have to be “enough” types to
complement the strategies that survived the IA process and make them states
in R∞AR.
Among the conditions that ensure the richness of the type space is com-
pleteness, i.e. that for each player i and every E ⊆ S−i × T−i there exists a
type of i, say ti such that Pi[ti] = E. But as shown in [6], a strategic belief
model cannot in fact satisfy this condition. That is, there necessarily exist
events that cannot be assumed by the players.
A weaker condition but one still strong enough may be provided as follows:
given a strategy s∗i ∈ Si, admissible with respect to S¯i× S¯−i ⊆ Si×S−i there
exists some ti ∈ Ti such that Πi(s∗i , s−i) ≥ Πi(si, s−i) for any s−i ∈ Pi[ti]|S¯−i
and any si ∈ S¯i. If this condition is satisfied by M for any i and every
S¯i × S¯−i ⊆ Si × S−i, M may be said to be rationality-complete.
We then have the following result:
Theorem 1. If M is rationality-complete and
∏n
i R
∞
i 6=∅, then R
∞
i|Si
= S∞i
for every i.
Proof: We will show that for any i, if R∞i 6= ∅ then for every m, R
m
i|Si
=
Sm+1i . We will proceed by induction over m:
• m = 0) Consider si ∈ R0i|Si . Then, there exists ti such that (si, ti) is
rational. Suppose si is not admissible with respect to Si× S−i. Then there
exists sˆi ∈ Si such that Πi(sˆi, s−i) ≥ Πi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ Pi[ti]|S−i .
But this contradicts that (si, ti) is rational. Thus, R
0
i|Si
⊆ S1i . Conversely,
if si ∈ S1i , by rationality-completeness we have that, since si is admissible
with respect to Si × S−i there exists ti such that Πi(si, s−i) ≥ Πi(sˆi, s−i)
for any s−i ∈ Pi[ti]|S−i and any sˆi ∈ Si. Then (si, ti) is rational and
belongs to R0i and consequently, si ∈ R
0
i|Si
. That is, R0
i|Si
⊇ S1i .
6• Suppose the claim is true for m = k. Let us see that it is also true for
k + 1. Take (si, ti) ∈ R
k+1
i . By definition, (si, ti) also belongs to R
k
i and
then si ∈ S
k+1
i . Suppose that si /∈ S
k+2
i . Then, there exists some sˆi ∈ S
k+1
i
such that Πi(sˆi, s−i) ≥ Πi(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S
k+2
−i , but then, since
ti ∈ R
k+1
i|Ti
, si is a best response to any s−i ∈ Rk−i|S−i=S
k+1
−i . In partic-
ular to any s−i ∈ S
k+2
−i ⊆S
k+1
−i . Contradiction. Then R
k+1
i ⊆ S
k+2
i . For
the converse, take si ∈ S
k+2
i and notice that, by rationality-completeness,
since si is admissible with respect to S
k+1
i × S
k+1
−i there exists ti such that
Πi(si, s−i) ≥ Πi(sˆi, s−i) for any s−i ∈ Pi[ti]|Sk+1−i
and any sˆi ∈ S
k+1
i .
Then (si, ti) belongs to R
k+1
i and consequently, si ∈ R
k+1
i|Si
. That is,
Rk+1
i|Si
⊇ Sk+2i .
1.5 Forcing in a Nutshell
There are certain interesting properties that a particular M might exhibit. In
particular, given the above result, we may be interested in the conditions that
ensure that
∏n
i R
∞
i 6=∅. Here is where the technique of forcing can be applied.
To describe what forcing is we draw heavily from [9], based in turn on the
original work of Paul Cohen [10]. See also [4], [3], [8],[12], [13] and [14], as well
as the intriguing application in [11].
Given a set-theoretic model M of an axiomatically described system, we
can define an extension of such a model by adjoining a set G to M , and
denoting the new model by M [G]. The nature of set G, which we will call a
generic set is such that, even being definable from withinM , it is indiscernable
fromM . By this we mean that the language within M allows us only to name
the elements of G, but not explicitly to describe their construction. In this way,
we do not have access to the inner structure of G, which remains unknowable
from the point of view of M – hence the use of the word generic (as referring
to the expression of something so “mixed up” or “common” that it cannot
be discerned). Once the generic G has been defined, the extension via G of
the ground model M allows for new and possibly surprising ways to satisfy
the ground axioms, with profound epistemic consequences. Indeed, although
truths in M [G] are not directly accessible, we can define what we call a forcing
relation between objects and relations at the level of the ground model. If one
object forces a certain relation on M , then, if that relation belongs to G (and
we might never be able to know that except as a modal claim across possible
models), then we obtain “truth” in M [G].
In what follows, we apply these methodological notions in order to extend
strategic belief models as defined above, thereby making possible the forcing of
a desirable epistemic property like R∞AR and indirectly the solution concept
SIA for any finite game G.
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1.6 Generic Types
Let us start with a given M0 intended as a family of events of the game along
with their underlying states of the game. This then constitutes our ground
model, on which a M with desired properties will subsequently be built. We
proceed by defining a family of forcing conditions, P with a partial order 
defined as follows:
• P= {φ = 〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 : every i is rational and there exists a
natural number m(φ) such that for any i, j, tj ∈ P
m(φ)
i [ti]}.
• For any φ, φ
′
∈ P , each one defined by a natural number (m(φ) andm(φ
′
)),
φ
′
 φ iff m(φ) ≥ m(φ
′
).
We say that if φ
′
 φ, then φ dominates φ
′
.
We then define the set of correct conditions, δ, which satisfies the conditions
of a filter in (P ,):
• If φ
′
∈ δ and φ
′
 φ then φ ∈ δ.
• If φ
′
, φ
′′
∈ δ there exists φ ∈ δ such that φ
′
 φ and φ
′′
 φ.
Our candidate is δ = {γ = 〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 : there exists a natural
number m(γ) such that for any i, (si, ti) ∈ R
m(γ)
i }. We then have that:
Proposition 1.6.1 δ is a correct set in P .
Proof: Let us see first that δ ⊆ P. That is, that for every γ ∈ δ there exists
φ ∈ P such that γ = φ. We know that γ=〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 where for
some m ≥ 0 every i is such that, (si, ti) ∈ Rmi . From this condition it follows
that each i is rational. We have now to show that for every i, j, tj ∈ P
m
i [ti].
Suppose not. Then, there exists a tk such that tk /∈ P
m
′
i [ti], with m
′
≤ m. This
means that there exists tl ∈ P
(m
′
−1)
i [ti] such that (sk, tk) /∈ Pl[tl]. But, on the
other hand, (sl, tl) ∈ Rml . We have by definition that (sl, tl) ∈ Sl × ASl[R
0
k]
which means that tl is such that (sk, tk) ∈ Pl[tl]. Contradiction.
The converse is also true: given a state 〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉∈ P, it follows
that there exists m such that each (si, ti) ∈ Rmi . Suppose not. Then, for a pair
i, j, tj /∈ ASj [Rm
′
i ] for some m
′
≤ m. Then Pj [tj ]|Si×Ti 6= R
m
′
i . In particular,
we have that ti /∈ Pm
′
j [tj ]. Contradiction.
From this last implication it follows that if φ
′
∈ δ and φ
′
 φ then φ ∈ δ.
This is because m(φ
′
) ≤ m(φ) and φ is such that every i is rational and for
every pair i, j, tj ∈ P
m(φ)
i , which in turn implies that every (si, ti) ∈ R
m(φ)
i
and therefore, φ ∈ δ.
Finally, given φ
′
, φ
′′
∈ δ, just takem as the maximum ofm(φ
′
) andm(φ
′′
).
Without loss of generality let us assume that m = m(φ
′
). Then, we take φ = φ
′
and it is easy to see that φ
′
 φ and φ
′′
 φ.
8We can now define a class of conditions called a domination, D ⊆ P (a
dense set):
∀φ
′
∈ P ∃φ ∈ D such that φ
′
 φ
We say that a correct set G is generic if G ⊆ δ and G ∩ D 6= ∅ for any
domination D. We then have that:
Theorem 2. G = {γ ∈ δ : γ = 〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 with for every m
and every i, (si, ti) ∈ Rmi } is a generic set.
Proof: By Proposition 1.6.1, δ is a correct set and so is G ⊂ δ. To see that
it is generic, just consider any φ ∈ P, which is identified by a finite natural
number m(φ). Then, by definition, γ ∈ G is such that for every i, (si, ti) ∈ Rmi
for every m, in particular with m ≥ m(φ). Then, φ  γ.
In the context of the previous discussion, we can say that G defines a set of
types {t∗i }i∈I such that each one, joint with the corresponding s
∗
i , satisfies the
condition that (s∗i , t
∗
i ) ∈ R
m
i for every m ≥ 0. That is, each i is, with her type
and the correponding strategy, rational and assumes rationality at all levels.
In other words, it satifies R∞AR. In accordance with Cohen’s technique, these
generic types cannot be defined in the language of M0. That is, there is no
property λ expressible in M0 such that:
4
∀ti ∈ Ti λ(ti)⇔ ∃γ ∈ G such that ∃si ∈ Si (si, ti) ∈ R
m(γ)
i
This realization is quite important since, as shown in [6], M0 is not defin-
able complete, i.e. there exists some event E ∈M0, definable by a property λE
(i.e. 〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 ∈ E ⇔ λE(〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉)) such that there
exists a i for whom no ti ∈ Ti satisfies Pi[ti] = E|
∏
j 6=i(Sj×Tj)
.5
But forcing shows that M0 can be extended to M0[G], to which the object
constructed by G, i.e. the class of generic types, belongs. To define M0[G], we
will consider the names of objects in G. The G-names are recursively defined
sets of the form {(µ, γ) : µ is a G − name and γ ∈ G}. These can be ordered
in terms of their rank, where a name µ of rank 0 is the set of pairs (∅, γ) with
m(γ) = 0 and, recursively, we say that µ is of rank m if it includes all the
pairs (µ
′
, γ) such that m(γ) = m and the rank of µ
′
, m
′
, verifies m
′
< m.
The referential value of a name µ, rG(µ) is then also defined recursively:
• If the rank of µ is 0, rG(µ) = {〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 ∈
∏
i(Si × Ti) :
(si, ti) ∈ R0i } iff there exists (∅, γ) ∈ µ. It is rG(µ) = M0[G], otherwise.
• If the rank of µ is m, rG(µ) = {rG(µ
′
) : ∃(µ
′
, γ) ∈ µ}.
It is easy to see that names of rank 0 yield all the states in which all
players are rational, while for any m > 0 the names have as referential values
4 The generic types are indiscernable in M0 [9].
5 See also [19].
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all the states in which the players are rational and assume up to level m the
rationality of the others.
Then, M0[G] = {rG(µ) : µ is a name in M0}. We have:
Proposition 1.6.2 M0 ⊂M0[G].
Proof: Trivial. Just take any name µ such that for every γ ∈ G, (∅, γ) /∈ µ.
It is easy to find an event in M0 satisfying this condition: take anyone in
which the states are such that there exist i and j, with (si, ti) ∈ R
mi
i and
(sj , tj) ∈ R
mj
j and mi 6= mj.
While G is not an element of M0, our recursive method has guaranteed
that it exists in M0[G] as “namable” although not strictly constructible. This
object represents the class of states in which each (si, ti; s−i, t−i) ∈ R∞AR.
If we take the statement Ψ(〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉) which is true iff each
(si, ti; s−i, t−i) ∈ R∞AR, we know that:
M0[G] |= Ψ(〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉)
and by the central result in forcing6, if µ is a name in M0 such that
〈(s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn)〉 ∈ rG(µ) we have that γ ∈ G is such that:
γ  Ψ(µ)
i.e. the generic types force R∞AR even though the space of types involved is
not strictly complete.
We are now able to present the main result of the application of forcing
to strategic belief models by bringing the discussion immediately above into
conjunction with the earlier theorem concerning rationality-completeness:
Proposition 1.6.3 If M0 is rationality-complete, R
∞
i|Si
= S∞i for every i.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 1 and that M0[G] is such that
∏n
i R
∞
i 6= ∅.
In this sense, we have defined a class of types involved in the charac-
terization of SIA over any G with arbitrary (finite) numbers of players and
actions. In other words, given the result above and our application of forcing
to the space of types via generic types, we are able to ensure the sufficiency
of rationality-completeness for the characterization of IA for a very general
class of games.
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